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September 29, 1993

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

DECL: OADR

TO: NSC - Jennifer Ward
FROM: AF/C - Arlene Render
SUBJECT: Peacekeeping Options in Rwanda

ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND

The Peace Accord and the NIF. On August 4, 1993, after over one year of negotiations, the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) signed a final peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, putting a formal end to nearly three years of war. The agreement provides that a Neutral International Force (NIF) will ensure implementation of the peace accords, and both sides have requested that the UN provide this force. The parties expect the NIF to create the necessary climate of security for creation of a coalition government in Kigali and to oversee disengagement of troops, disarmament, and force integration, and demobilization.

The Humanitarian Costs. The war, which had its roots in ethnic conflict between majority Hutu and minority Tutsi groups, displaced approximately one million people, about one-seventh of the country's population, and produced thousands of military and civilian casualties. Humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone has already reached \$100 million, with the U.S. government having committed to provide over \$34 million. Although the majority of the displaced have begun to return to their homes, approximately 350,000 cannot return until the RPF gives up the territory it holds and enters into encampments as part of the process of force integration.

The Transition Government. The peace accord provides for a coalition government which will oversee a 22-month transition period ending in multiparty democratic national elections. The government was supposed to come into being on September 10. However, the deadline could not be met, given the non-deployment of the NIF, which is expected to provide the necessary climate of security to allow the RPF to come to Kigali to join the government.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: FRANK E. SCHMELZER
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The Military Picture. The GOR has roughly 30,000 troops and the RPF has approximately 20,000. The two sides remain in defensive positions on either side of a Demilitarized Zone in the northern part of the country, and an effective ceasefire has been in place since March. The ceasefire is monitored by the OAU's 130-man Neutral Military Observers Group ("NMOG"), currently composed of 30 Senegalese, 25 Congolese, 60 Tunisians and representatives from the GOR and RPF. In June, the UN Security Council approved an 81-person observer mission to monitor the Rwanda/Uganda border for cross-border arms shipments. The French have 300 troops deployed in the Kigali area to protect the expatriate community. Under the peace accords, RPF officials can bring a security force of up to 600 lightly armed troops to Kigali, but the officials and their security force will not enter the capital until the NIF has been deployed and the French have withdrawn their troops.

U.S. Involvement. The U.S. was instrumental in persuading the two sides to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflict. We initiated the dialogue between the GOR and the RPF, our government sent active observers to the peace talks in Arusha, and we provided \$1 million to the OAU to assist it in fielding the NMOG ceasefire monitors.

ASSESSMENT

I. U.S. Interests

The U.S. has both political and humanitarian interests in Rwanda. Politically, the U.S. seeks to promote the fundamental foreign policy goals of conflict resolution and democratization. Deployment of a NIF will create the necessary climate of security and confidence to allow the multiparty coalition government to form and thus begin the transition to multiparty democratic elections. Without a NIF, the GOR will not ask the French to withdraw their troops, the RPF will not join the government, and the transition to democracy cannot begin.

The U.S. also has a strong interest in ending the humanitarian crisis that the conflict engendered. Several hundred thousand Rwandans remain displaced and cannot return to their homes until the RPF vacates its stronghold in the North and enters encampments as part of the demobilization process.

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However, the RPF will not move to assembly points and begin demobilization until a NIF has been deployed. Thus, until peacekeepers arrive, the displaced will remain in their camps and will require continued massive humanitarian assistance, with the U.S. the principal humanitarian aid donor.

Without a NIF, the parties face a political and military stalemate that cannot last indefinitely. The current interim government, which does not include the RPF, is merely a caretaker, without the power or the mandate to pursue the transition to full democracy or to address the country's post-war problems of reconstruction, demobilization, and return of refugees. Although the two military forces have respected the ceasefire for six months, they cannot remain in defensive positions indefinitely, no matter how strong their political will to make peace. Unless peacekeepers are deployed to enable the transition to begin, the peace process may ultimately unravel, leading to renewed fighting and continued massive humanitarian aid.

II. Internal Rwandan Situation and Prospects for PKO Success

Despite longstanding ethnic resentments, the Rwandan Government and the RPF showed real willingness to compromise during their year-long negotiations. The two sides, and the Rwandan people, are war-weary and want peace. A political settlement has already been negotiated. The two sides have been meeting regularly at all levels since the signing of the peace accord and, as a sign of their commitment to the peace process, they sent a joint delegation to the UN and Security Council member capitals to push for rapid deployment of a NIF so that the transitional government can get underway. President Habyarimana held a conciliatory meeting in the DMZ with RPF Chairman Kanyarengwe on September 13 and plans to visit the U.S. in early October to press for support for a UN peacekeeping mission. All the two sides need now is deployment of international peacekeepers to provide a confidence building measure to proceed with implementation of the peace accords. These circumstances significantly increase the likelihood of success of a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda.

Unlike in other recent operations, the peacekeeping force in Rwanda is not likely to face serious danger or resistance. Both sides, as well as the general population, want the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force so that the peace process can proceed. As a cultural matter, Rwandans have a great deal of respect for Westerners and are unlikely to support hostile actions against a UN force. The experience of the OAU's NMOG is also instructive. In the twelve months that the OAU troops have been deployed in Rwanda, they have never come under attack or suffered a casualty.

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III. RWANDA AND THE CRITERIA FOR NEW UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Is there a threat to international peace and security? Yes. The RPF invaded Rwanda from Ugandan territory in 1990. The war displaced one million persons, creating a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action, coupled with violence.

Is there an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis? Yes. The international community has addressed the Rwandan problem through wide participation in the peace talks and deployment of an OAU ceasefire monitoring force and a UN border monitoring force. At least ten Security Council members have voiced support for a new UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda.

Are there clear objectives, including an understanding of where the mission fits on the peacekeeping spectrum? Yes. This would be a classic Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, where the UN would monitor the ceasefire, force integration, demobilization, and other agreements between the parties. No peace enforcement powers would be involved.

Is a ceasefire in place and have the parties consented to the operation? Yes. The ceasefire has been holding for six months. The two sides requested deployment of a peacekeeping force as part of the peaceful transition to democracy.

Are the means available, including:

(a) Forces? Yes. The UN has informally contacted several countries (Canada, Senegal, Morocco, Togo) which have expressed willingness to consider contributing troops. The Belgians have said they may contribute 300, and the Egyptians have indicated they could supply a battalion. The 200 or so NMORG and UN border monitors can be fairly easily incorporated into the proposed UN NIF. (There is no plan to offer U.S. troops, and we have informally indicated as much to the Rwandans.)

(b) Mandate?: Yes. The mandate would be to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement, contributing to the disengagement, demobilization and force integration phases, while assuring an adequate level of security.

(c) Finance? Not yet. However, in proposing a phased deployment, the Secretary General has shown his sensitivity to costs. His report attempts to identify the minimum credible peacekeeping force, without jeopardizing the operation's success. If the force is paid for by increasing our arrears, savings in humanitarian aid could be viewed as an offset.

Can an end-point be identified? Yes. The installation of a democratically elected government at the end of the transition and electoral process (approximately 22-25 months after adoption of a Security Council resolution).

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POLICY OPTIONS

Option 1 - Approve the proposed UN multi-phased 25-month operation in its entirety. The operation calls for rapid deployment to Kigali of a battalion of 800 peacekeepers to allow the transition government to form, followed by deployment of a second battalion in the DMZ to oversee force integration and demobilization. Troop strength would then be drawn down during the final electoral phase. The overall force would include roughly 300 military observers, 60 civilian police monitors, and logistics, engineering, medical, and civilian support staff. Counting all personnel, the peak size would be 2,548 (for a period of four months) and the low point would be 800. The average total personnel would be about 1,600. According to the UN Report, the estimated cost for the initial 6 months period would be 62 million dollars. Assuming an assessed operation and no voluntary side contributions, the U.S. share would be roughly 18.5 million dollars.

Advantages

- o Would advance U.S. goal of peaceful conflict resolution.
- o Would permit transitional government to form, giving effect to the political settlement between the parties and launching the transition to multiparty democracy -- another fundamental U.S. foreign policy goal.
- o Would permit the displaced to return home, ending the need for massive humanitarian assistance and saving the U.S. an estimated \$35 million per year.
- o Would enable the hundreds of thousands of refugees to return home, some after thirty years or more in exile.
- o Would commit the UN for the entire transition period, thereby increasing the likelihood of successful transition to democracy.
- o Would ensure that the U.S. would see a payoff for its substantial investment in the Rwandan peace process.
- o Presents minimal risks and could provide an easy, needed success for UN peacekeeping.
- o Would support France's strong policy goal of withdrawing from Rwanda without destabilizing the country. This could bolster French support for U.S. foreign policy goals elsewhere in Africa.

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- o Would give the job to the only international body able and willing to take up the peacekeeping mandate. (The OAU does not have the resources or capabilities to mount a credible peacekeeping mission in Rwanda and wants the UN to step in.)

Disadvantages

- o Is the most expansive, and therefore most costly, option.
- o Locks the UN into specific troop figures for the entire transition period.
- o Would exacerbate the already large U.S. and UN peacekeeping budget deficits.
- o The U.S. is already in arrears in assessed operations, and finding enough contributors to a voluntary fund would be problematic.
- o Although the risks to UN troops are minimal, as with any military operation, there is always some chance the situation could deteriorate and peace enforcement become necessary.

Option 2 - Support the draft French resolution, which calls for deployment of the initial peacekeepers in Kigali, but does not specify a troop total, and does not specifically commit the UN to additional deployments in later phases. (The first French draft -- like the UN report -- specified an initial deployment of 800 in Kigali, but the French subsequently removed any reference to specific troop numbers.) The draft resolution does, however, approve the principle of a multi-phased operation lasting the length of the transition period.

Advantages

- o Gives the UN more flexibility to assess the need for additional troops in later phases.
- o Commits the UN to pay only for phase one.
- o Leaves open the possibility that later deployments could be more modest, thereby saving money.
- o Would advance the U.S. goal of peaceful conflict resolution.
- o Would permit the transitional government to form, giving effect to the political settlement between the parties and launching the transition to multiparty democracy.

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- o If the transitional coalition government works out, the parties' confidence may be high enough to allow force integration and demobilization with minimal or no additional troop deployments.
- o Would permit the displaced to begin to return home, reducing the need for massive humanitarian assistance.
- o Would enable the hundreds of thousands of refugees to return home, some after thirty years or more in exile.
- o Would help ensure that the U.S. would see a payoff for its substantial investment in the Rwandan peace process.
- o Presents minimal risks and could provide an easy, needed success for UN peacekeeping.
- o Would support France's strong policy goal of withdrawing from Rwanda without destabilizing the country. This could bolster French support for U.S. foreign policy goals elsewhere in Africa.
- o Would give the job to the only international body able and willing to take up the peacekeeping mandate. (The OAU does not have the resources or capabilities to mount a credible peacekeeping mission in Rwanda and wants the UN to step in.)

Disadvantages

- o The UN might lose the will to proceed to stage two, which could jeopardize the overall peace process.
- o Would exacerbate the already large U.S. and UN peacekeeping budget deficits.
- o The U.S. is already in arrears in assessed operations, and finding enough contributors to a voluntary fund would be problematic.
- o Although the risks to UN troops are minimal, as with any military operation, there is always some chance the situation could deteriorate and peace enforcement become necessary.

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Option 3 - Modify the draft French resolution to provide for a lower initial deployment to 500 troops. (Prior to release of the UN Report, the French had told us that they wanted rapid deployment of a UN force of 500 in Kigali. The French are aware of our cost concerns. The fact that they omitted the 800 figure from their later draft suggests that they may be willing to accept fewer troops than the UN report calls for.)

Advantages

- o Would be less expensive than the initial French proposal or the Secretary General's proposal.
- o Is the minimum troop number that would be politically acceptable to the RPF and the French. If the contingent were less than 500, it is questionable whether the French would withdraw or the RPF would come to Kigali to join the transition government.
 - Still gives the UN flexibility to assess the need for additional troops in later phases.
- o Commits the UN to pay only for phase one.
- o Leaves open the possibility that later deployments could be more modest, thereby saving money.
- o Would advance the U.S. goal of peaceful conflict resolution.
- o Would permit the transitional government to form, giving effect to the political settlement between the parties and launching the transition to multiparty democracy.
- o If the transitional coalition government works out, the parties' confidence may be high enough to allow force integration and demobilization with minimal or no additional troop deployments.
- o Would permit the displaced to return home, ending the need for massive humanitarian assistance and saving the U.S. an estimated \$35 million per year.
- o Would enable the hundreds of thousands of refugees to return home, some after thirty years or more in exile.
- o Would ensure that the U.S. would see a payoff for its substantial investment in the Rwandan peace process.
- o Presents minimal risks and could provide an easy, needed success for UN peacekeeping.

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- o Would support France's strong policy goal of withdrawing from Rwanda without destabilizing the country. This could bolster French support for U.S. foreign policy goals elsewhere in Africa.
- o Would give the job to the only international body able and willing to take up the peacekeeping mandate. (The OAU does not have the resources or capabilities to mount a credible peacekeeping mission in Rwanda and wants the UN to step in.)

Disadvantages

- o The force might not be large enough, from a military standpoint, to perform its mission.
- o The UN might lose the will to proceed to stage two, which could jeopardize the overall peace process.
- o Even for an operation this small, funding would be problematic.
- o The U.S. is already in arrears in assessed operations, and finding enough contributors to a voluntary fund would be problematic.
- o Although the risks to UN troops are minimal, as with any military operation, there is always some chance the situation could deteriorate and peace enforcement become

Option 4 - U.S. Veto of Peacekeeping Operation

Advantage

- o Would not increase the U.S. or UN peacekeeping budget deficits.

Disadvantages

- o Will perpetuate massive relief costs.
- o Will most likely lead to the collapse of the peace in Rwanda, which risks regional destabilization
- o International inaction would highlight the marginalization of Africa

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- o Ignores USG policy goals of conflict resolution and democratization
- o Nullifies the US investment in resolution of the Rwandan civil war, including more than one year of diplomatic effort.
- o If the U.S. decides now to oppose deployment of UN peacekeepers, we could be seen as blocking the peace process and preventing the transition to democracy. This could affect our credibility throughout the region.
- o We would miss the chance at a likely peacekeeping success.
- o Would set a bad precedent and signal that the U.S. is biased
- o If the U.S. blocks a peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, it could damage prospects for cooperation with France on a whole range of key African issues.

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